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The Dark Side of Commodification Critiques:  
Politics and Elitism in Standardized Testing  
Kimberly D. Krawiec  
In Testing as Commodification, Katharine Silbaugh argues that 
debates within the standardized testing literature represent a split 
similar to the one witnessed in traditional debates on the 
commodifying effects of market exchange: those who extol the 
virtues of a common metric by which to make comparisons and 
evaluations, on the one hand, versus those who argue that test scores 
have swallowed other notions of the public good in education, on the 
other.
1
 Though the analogy is imperfect, as Silbaugh acknowledges, I 
agree that the objections to markets and to standardized testing are 
sufficiently similar to render the comparison fruitful.  
However, the analogy shows more than Silbaugh acknowledges. 
Whereas Silbaugh concludes that her comparison demonstrates the 
failure of standardized testing, I contend that it primarily 
demonstrates the politically driven and elitist nature of much of the 
standardized testing debate.  
Politics and elitism in commodification-like protests to 
standardized testing should not be terribly surprising. Almost since 
their inception, commodification objections have held an elitist flavor 
and—because they are more likely to resonate with audiences than 
narrower appeals to self-interest—have been invoked for political 
gains. If standardized testing debates bear similarities to market 
commodification debates, it is only natural that the parallels extend to 
these traits as well. 
Part I isolates three conceptions of commodification identifiable 
in the literature on markets—cognitive (or value) 
incommensurability, constitutive incommensurability, and corruption 
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—arguing that, although the standardized testing literature bears hints 
of the cognitive incommensurability and corruption objections, the 
widespread moral outrage typically associated with constitutive 
incommensurability is largely absent. As a result, some objections to 
standardized testing may be addressable through system 
modifications in ways that objections to markets are not.  
Part II focuses on the most striking similarities between the 
standardized testing debate and more traditional commodification 
debates. First, commodification objections in both settings are 
political, meaning that they are often invoked by constituencies in 
pursuit of a self-interest that is at odds with broader social goals. 
Second, they are often elitist, in the sense that the freedom to ponder 
the value of social goods other than individual economic betterment 
is a luxury not available to all. Finally, they are a catch-all—not all of 
the objections to markets (or standardized testing) that are packaged 
under the commodification rubric are necessarily about 
commodification, nor are they the inevitable result of market 
exchange or standardization. Part III concludes that this dark side of 
commodification critiques casts doubt on the extent to which 
Silbaugh’s commodification analogy undermines the case for 
standardized testing.  
I. THREE CONCEPTIONS OF COMMODIFICATION 
It is worth specifying at the outset precisely what it means to 
object to markets (or standardized testing) on commodification 
grounds. The task is not an easy one, as the term is often loosely 
employed to cover a range of objections to particular markets.
2
 
Moreover, as Silbaugh notes, the comparison between the testing 
movement and the commodification literature is not perfect, 
rendering the definitional question yet more complex.
3
  
In this section, I identify three different, but related, 
commodification objections to markets: ―value‖ or cognitive 
 
 2. See generally I. Glenn Cohen, Note, The Price Of Everything, the Value of Nothing: 
Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2003) (noting the imprecision 
with which the term commodification is invoked in market debates and proposing a 
categorization).  
 3. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 332, 336. 
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incommensurability, constitutive incommensurability, and 
corruption.
4
 Hints of the cognitive incommensurability and 
corruption objections to markets can be found in the standardized 
testing literature. However, the moral outrage that characterizes 
constitutive incommensurability and typically is associated with 
taboo markets such as babies, sex, and human organs is largely 
absent in the standardized testing debate. As a result, some 
standardized testing critiques may be addressable through tweaks to 
the system in ways that objections to certain markets are not. 
A. Value, or Cognitive, Incommensurability 
When values are cognitively incommensurable, people are unable 
or unwilling to evaluate certain comparisons because they have no 
basis by which to determine how much of X to give up in exchange 
for Y; in other words, X and Y are measured on different scales.
5
 As 
Silbaugh notes, ―We might call a person adventurous and another 
loyal, recognize that these are different values, struggle to compare 
them, but in the end recognize that they will not be pressed into an 
agreeable ordering.‖6  
This seems a clear point of commonality between objections to 
standardized testing and objections to markets, as Silbaugh suggests. 
Elizabeth Anderson, for example, argues that ―[b]ecause people value 
different goods in different ways,‖ borders must be erected between 
the market and ―other domains of self-expression.‖7 Market critics 
thus argue against the valuation of many goods, services, or 
relationships in monetary terms, contending that the market valuation 
of sex, friendship, and reproductive services, among others, is 
inappropriate.
8
  
 
 4. Many also raise coercion objections to markets. This objection rests on the purported 
need to protect vulnerable populations from financial lures that might encourage unwise risk-
taking or otherwise induce bargains that the seller would never agree to in the absence of 
radically unequal economic conditions. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 
N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1742–43 (2010) (distinguishing commodification from coercion).  
 5. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 321–28 (1986) (defining and discussing 
incommensurability in great detail).  
 6. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 333. 
 7. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 141 (1993). 
 8. See generally Krawiec, supra note 4 (discussing commodification objections to 
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Critics raise similar objections to standardized testing. How do we 
compare reading or math ability to team-building skill, leadership, or 
ethics, to borrow the examples employed by Silbaugh? We might 
recognize that all are valuable, yet irreducible to a common metric. 
This is one hurdle (though, as I elaborate below, not an 
insurmountable one) to the meaningful use of standardized testing 
data—it can be reductionist in precisely this way.9  
B. Constitutive Incommensurability 
But cognitive, or value, incommensurability is only part of what is 
at work in most commodification-based objections to markets. My 
offer to Silbaugh of $500 to be my friend is likely to make her angry, 
not just confused. Offers of cash for her children or organs are likely 
to elicit even stronger emotions, prompting outrage and a desire for 
norm enforcement.
10
 As Joseph Raz observes, ―[F]or almost every 
person there are comparisons that he will feel indignant if asked to 
make, and which he will, in normal circumstances, emphatically 
refuse to make.‖11  
In other words, there are comparisons that elicit more than the 
mere confusion or inability to compare values associated with value 
incommensurability, instead engendering anger, moral outrage, and a 
desire for norm enforcement. Such comparisons are constitutively 
incommensurable—not just confusing, but so immoral that merely to 
consider them compromises the individual’s self-image as a member 
of the relevant social community.
12
  
My offer of $500 in exchange for friendship is troubling, not 
simply because most people are unable to compare friendship along 
 
prostitution, commercial surrogacy, and compensated oocyte donation); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, 
THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005) (demonstrating that the intermingling of economic 
transactions with intimate relations causes discomfort both for individuals and for U.S. law, 
despite the fact that such intermingling occurs with great frequency). 
 9. See infra Part II.C (arguing that many objections to standardized testing are really 
implementation critiques, rather than critiques of standardized testing itself). 
 10. Alan Page Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions 
that Transgress the Spheres of Justice, 18 POL. PSYCHOL. 255, 256 (1997).  
 11. RAZ, supra note 5, at 346; see also ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 44–64 (discussing 
incommensurability of this sort). 
 12. RAZ, supra note 5, at 345–53 (introducing the concept of constitutive 
incommensurables); Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 10, at 256.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/17
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011]  The Dark Side of Commodification Critiques 353 
 
 
the monetary metric but because we are not supposed to. My failure 
to realize this fact immediately confirms that we cannot be true 
friends—I have already signaled my failure to understand the 
meaning of that relationship. 
Many commodification objections to markets are of this 
constitutive variety. For example, commercial surrogacy implies to 
many market critics a society that fails to understand the unique 
importance of motherhood, prostitution a culture that insults the 
intimate nature of sexual relations, and cost-benefit analysis a world 
that fails to grasp the significance of human life.
13
 Some reactions to 
market pricing mechanisms—for example, organ sales—may reflect 
a visceral sense of pure repugnance.
14
 
Do standardized testing objections stem from a similar sense of 
constitutive incommensurability? I suspect not. The comparison of 
standardized testing to markets seems much more tenuous here. 
Though Silbaugh mentions anecdotes that hint at potential 
constitutive incommensurability concerns, there is little in the 
paper—or elsewhere—to suggest that standardized testing prompts 
the widespread sense of moral outrage typically associated with 
markets in sex, body parts, children, or other traditionally taboo 
exchanges.  
This difference carries implications for the viability of 
standardized testing. As Al Roth has noted, repugnance can be a 
serious constraint to both markets involving money and allocation 
procedures that do not involve monetary transactions.
15
 Constitutive 
incommensurability concerns are difficult to overcome because they 
are resistant to welfare analysis or arguments regarding means to 
contain or minimize any harms or downsides associated with the 
activity in question.
16
 But if commodification objections to 
 
 13. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Show Me The Money: Making Markets in 
Forbidden Exchange, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2009, at i (discussing a range of 
―taboo trades‖). 
 14. See Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 
2007, at 37 (discussing the traditional repugnance toward certain exchanges).  
 15. Id. at 50–54. 
 16. Id. This is not to suggest that constitutive incommensurability objections cannot be 
overcome. Indeed, resistance to constitutively incommensurable transactions is malleable and 
context-dependent, varying across time and cultures. Krawiec, supra note 13, at iv. Individuals 
adopt a variety of coping strategies to relieve the cognitive discomfort caused by constitutively 
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standardized testing are largely of the cognitive, rather than 
constitutive, incommensurability variety, then those objections may 
be addressable through tweaks, rather than abandonment, of the 
system. 
C. Corruption 
The third variant on the commodification objection is corruption: 
the notion that valuation or exchange metrics from one sphere, 
relationship, or setting will necessarily invade or crowd out other 
modes of valuation or comparison.
17
 Silbaugh correctly hones in on 
an unresolved tension in the corruption debate, asking (but not 
answering) the question of ―why market valuation is particularly 
unifying.‖18 Michael Sandel describes the corruption problem as 
follows:  
[T]he argument from corruption appeals to the character of the 
particular good in question. In the cases of surrogacy, baby-
selling, and sperm-selling, the ideals at stake are bound up with 
the meaning of motherhood, fatherhood, and the nurturing of 
children. Once we characterize the good at stake, it is always a 
further question whether, or in what respect, market valuation 
and exchange diminishes or corrupts the character of that 
good.
19
 
Silbaugh argues that corruption fears play a large role in 
standardized testing debates. She contends, moreover, that such fears 
are warranted, stating: 
Here the need to make items commensurable . . . actually 
transforms the character of the item. The description is self-
 
incommensurable choices and comparisons, including the ready acceptance of smoke screens 
and redefining the transaction. Philip E. Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and 
Taboo Cognitions, 7 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 320, 320–21 (2003). 
 17. Michael J. Sandel, Prof. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral 
Limits of Markets, Lecture at Brasenose College, Oxford (May 11–12, 1998), in THE TANNER 
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 89, 94–95 (1998), available at http://www.tannerlectures.utah. 
edu/lectures/documents/sandel00.pdf (discussing corruption). 
 18. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 315. 
 19. Sandel, supra note 17, at 104. 
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fulfilling: education becomes the thing we have tools to 
measure about education.  
 In the context of education, it is difficult to argue that this 
commensurability has not corrupted the character of the item, 
because what schools do has changed since we began forcing 
schools to measure and compare along a common metric.
20
  
Numerous objections have been raised against the corruption 
argument, including its unproven empirical assumptions and potential 
essentialism.
21
 Even advocates of the corruption objection recognize 
these difficulties.
22
 I put that debate to one side, however, for the 
purposes of this Article, because it is tangential to the primary lessons 
to be drawn from the comparison between standardized testing 
disputes and traditional commodification debates. In the following 
section, I proceed to the heart of the problem with commodification 
objections generally and their specific application to standardized 
testing: they are often political, elitist, and a catch-all category for 
implementation critiques that are not an inevitable consequence of 
standardization or of markets. 
II. THE DARK SIDE OF COMMODIFICATION CRITIQUES 
Regardless of the above similarities and differences between 
commodification objections in the market and standardized testing 
contexts, the commodification objection bears three similarities 
across the two settings that, understandably, are not explicitly raised 
by commodification critics, and are not raised by Silbaugh. These 
similarities inspire the reference to ―the dark side of commodification 
critiques‖ in this Article’s title and cast doubt on whether Silbaugh’s 
commodification analogy demonstrates that standardized testing is 
the problem for public education that she contends.  
 
 20. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 325. 
 21. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 290–93 (1999) (challenging 
commodification, coercion, and related objections to prostitution specifically, and to the sale of 
bodily services more generally); Krawiec, supra note 4 (criticizing commodification objections 
to sex work and the sale of reproductive services).  
 22. See Sandel, supra note 17, at 105–07. 
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Specifically, commodification objections to markets are often: (1) 
political, in that they are sometimes raised by constituencies in 
pursuit of a self-interest that is at odds with broader social goals; (2) 
elitist, in that the freedom to ponder the value of social goods other 
than individual economic betterment is a luxury not available to all; 
and (3) a catch-all, in that not all of the objections to markets (or 
standardized testing) that are packaged under the commodification 
rubric are necessarily about commodification, nor are they the 
inevitable result of market exchange or standardization. As I 
demonstrate in this section, the same is true of many of Silbaugh’s 
objections to standardized testing. 
A. Politics 
The first unstated similarity between commodification objections 
in the market and standardized testing settings is their political 
nature: commodification objections are sometimes raised by 
constituencies in pursuit of a self-interest at odds with broader 
societal goals. Commodification concerns, by tapping into individual 
emotions and social norms, may be employed for strategic purposes 
more effectively than narrow appeals to selfish ends, such as rent 
seeking. 
For example, the insurance industry lobby objects to 
commodifying life and gambling on death through various secondary 
markets in life insurance, though annuities commodify life and 
gamble on death in a similar fashion.
23
 Coincidentally, secondary life 
insurance markets are an economic threat to the insurance industry, 
which priced existing premiums on an assumption that many insureds 
would allow policies to lapse or trade them in for a fraction of face 
value, rather than selling them on the secondary market to investors.
24
 
 
 23. Roth, supra note 14, at 53. For an exhaustive, and fascinating, treatment of available 
insurance vehicles, as well as gaps and asymmetries in insurance options, see Lee Fennell, 
Unbundling Risk, 60 DUKE L.J. (2011). 
 24. Jenny Anderson, Wall Street Pursues Profit in Bundles of Life Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 5, 2009, at A1 (noting the insurance industry’s objections to securitized life settlements as 
―a gambling product‖ and not ―what life insurance is supposed to be‖ and further noting that the 
insurance industry would lose money as a result of the innovation because investors would 
continue to pay premiums and collect on the policies, rather than allowing them to lapse as do 
many insureds).  
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Similarly, the fertility industry defends its price controls on 
oocytes—the same type of professional price fixing agreement that 
has long been considered per se illegal in less politically charged 
industries—on commodification, among other, grounds.25 
Given the ease with which narrow self-interest can, in certain 
settings, be repackaged as broader commodification concerns, it is 
hardly surprising that many of the commodification-like objections to 
standardized testing emanate from educators themselves. As Silbaugh 
notes, the entire point of the standardized testing program in public 
education was to establish a metric by which educators and districts 
could be held accountable for performance failures.
26
 Not 
surprisingly, educators as a group prefer self-control to such 
accountability to outsiders. Teachers and school districts alike have 
less autonomy and flexibility under the current standardized testing 
system and are now subject to more outside scrutiny. Educators’ 
resistance to standardized testing is thus consistent with their own 
collective self-interest and with their opposition to merit pay, 
vouchers, and a variety of other mechanisms that would subject 
educators and school systems to competitive forces or outside 
evaluation.
27
 
Silbaugh discusses teacher resistance to merit pay, but as evidence 
of ―the cultural differences between schools and policy makers‖ and 
as a ―potential insight into the intrinsic motivations of educators and 
the alternative (non-market) values in the school’s culture.‖28 While it 
is, of course, possible that the divide between the public’s and 
educators’ views on the appropriate role of market forces and 
competition in education is attributable to cultural differences or 
divergent understandings of intrinsic motivations, the more obvious 
possibility is that teachers, as a collective body, benefit from an 
insulation from competition.  
 
 25. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price-
Fixing in the Gamete Market, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2009, at 59 (discussing price 
controls in the oocyte market). 
 26. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 311. 
 27. See William Howell, Paul E. Peterson & Martin West, Education Next-PEPG Survey 
2010, EDUC. NEXT (Aug. 25, 2010), http://educationnext.org/files/Complete_Survey_Results_ 
2010.pdf.  
 28. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 321. 
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Research indicates, for example, that pay dispersion is lower 
among unionized workers than among the non-unionized for a variety 
of reasons, including that unions traditionally have opposed merit pay 
schemes.
29
 Although there are several potential explanations for this 
opposition, one is: 
[T]he principle that employees can collectively bargain with 
their employer over pay . . . . Where pay is determined by a set 
of performance indicators, rather than through collective 
bargaining, trade unions and the workers they represent lose 
vital influence over pay and related matters.
30
  
This is not to suggest that educators have no valid objections to 
standardized testing (or to vouchers and merit pay, for that matter). 
Teachers are, after all, education experts and are also well positioned 
on the front lines of public education to render useful insights. But, 
given the interests at stake, it would be naïve to accept their 
objections to standardized testing at face value.  
B. Elitism 
A second similarity between commodification objections to 
markets and those to standardized testing is their frequently elitist 
nature. Kenneth Arrow raised this point in 1972, when comparing 
Richard Titmuss’s views on the impersonal altruism of the small 
number of blood donors in the United Kingdom to an ―aristocracy of 
saints.‖31 Martha Nussbaum reaffirmed it when she argued that much 
commodification-based opposition to sex work fails to appreciate the 
―other realities of working life of which it is a part.‖32 
 
 29. See generally David Metcalf, Kirstine Hansen & Andy Charlwood, Unions and the 
Sword of Justice: Unions and Pay Systems, Pay Inequality, Pay Discrimination and Low Pay, 
167 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 61 (2001). Other reasons include that unionized jobs are more 
homogenized than nonunion jobs and that unions negotiate over the minimum wage, truncating 
the lower end of the pay scale. Id.  
 30. Id. at 63 (quoting Internal Policy Document, Communication Workers Union, 
Performance-Related Pay—Panacea or Pain? (1999)). Median voter models also predict that 
over half of employees will favor a redistribution of wages towards the lower end of the pay 
scale. Id. 
 31. Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 360 (1972). 
 32. NUSSBAUM, supra note 21, at 297.  
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Silbaugh mentions repeatedly that difficult-to-test topics such as 
art, music, physical education, critical thinking, and the like are being 
dropped from the curriculum in favor of those subjects more 
amenable to standardized testing, emphasizing that the burden falls 
hardest on poorer school districts because more affluent suburban 
districts can afford to retain these subjects, while still attaining 
―adequate yearly progress.‖33 Assuming that it is true that art, music, 
critical thinking, and similar topics were systematically more likely to 
be included in the curricula of poorer school districts prior to the 
standardized testing movement, the empirical question of whether 
similarly situated students from poorer districts are better off learning 
art, music, and physical education than their more testable substitute 
topics remains an open empirical question.  
The reality of differential educational funding across school 
districts in the United States necessarily means that poorer districts 
are faced with choices and trade-offs: choices among students, 
choices among subjects, and choices among the various means to 
deploy scarce resources. Silbaugh’s argument that scarce time and 
resources are being spent on Subject A, rather than on Subject B, 
proves nothing in the absence of evidence that—given the necessity 
of choice—students would be better off learning B instead of A. If 
children in poorer school districts are being deprived of valuable 
education opportunities, the problem would appear to lie with the 
differential funding of public education in the United States and the 
consequent consistent poverty of some school districts, rather than 
with standardized testing.  
Finally, Silbaugh criticizes the flattening effect of standardized 
testing, arguing that: 
[t]he testing trend takes multiple values that have co-existed 
and reduces them to the one value, which even in its best light 
can only be expressed as competence in math, reading, and 
writing, without reference to other necessary skills for a 
fulfilling life or citizenship. Not only is this a flat choice 
among the numerous values public education serves, it fails to 
 
 33. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 319–20. 
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reach the citizenship values that have long helped to justify the 
public investment in free education.
34
 
But the freedom to focus on education’s role in citizenship values 
and an otherwise fulfilling life—rather than simple workforce 
readiness—is a luxury that many communities cannot afford. Indeed, 
the ability to view education as anything more than a means of 
individual (or familial) economic betterment is an indulgence not 
available to all, nor is any real ability to participate in the broader 
collective ―community‖ or exercise the rights and obligations of full 
citizenship associated with it.  
Silbaugh’s argument in this regard brings to mind Arrow’s 1972 
critique of Titmuss:  
[Titmuss] is especially interested in the expression of 
impersonal altruism. It is not the richness of family 
relationships or the close ties of a small community that he 
wishes to promote. It is rather a diffuse expression of 
confidence by individuals in the workings of a society as a 
whole. But such an expression of impersonal altruism is as far 
removed from the feelings of personal interaction as any 
marketplace. Indeed, the small number of blood donors in the 
United Kingdom suggests, if I were to generalize as freely as 
Titmuss does, the idea of an aristocracy of saints.
35
 
All else being equal, life may be richer, more robust, and better-
lived with a knowledge of art, music, and critical thinking. In an ideal 
world, these tools would be available to all. But Silbaugh fails to 
show that, in our far from ideal public education system, their neglect 
in favor of the deployment of scarce resources toward competence in 
reading, math, and writing is an unwise decision, much less an 
irrational one.  
 
 34. Id. at 332. 
 35. Arrow, supra note 31, at 360.  
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C. Commodification as a Catch-All 
Finally, not all of the objections to markets typically packaged 
under the commodification rubric are necessarily about 
commodification, nor are they the inevitable result of market 
exchange. Instead, ―commodification‖ often operates as a catch-all 
complaint to encompass a variety of concerns, many of which could 
be addressed through a better market (or better-regulated market).
36
 
Similarly, many of Silbaugh’s objections to standardized testing 
are not necessarily about commodification, nor are they the inevitable 
result of standardization. For example, Silbaugh cites to ―government 
statistics showing an increase in time spent on language arts and math 
and a decrease in time spent on science and social studies,‖ as 
evidence of the negative effects of standardized testing.
37
 She 
laments: 
[T]he consensus is that schools across the country have 
adapted their curricula to focus on subjects that are tested by 
reducing the time spent on subjects that are not a part of the 
testing program, such as social studies, and ones that are not 
susceptible to standardized testing at all, such as music, art, 
and physical education.
38
 
As discussed in Part II.B, above, Silbaugh never demonstrates 
why an increased focus on language arts and math is necessarily 
negative, even if it occurs at the expense of time spent on science and 
social studies. But assuming that she is correct, the problem she has 
identified is not one of commodification, nor even of standardization, 
but of implementation. She suggests no obvious reason why social 
studies, science, or even physical education could not successfully be 
implemented into the standardized testing program, or why those 
 
 36. Peggy Radin argues, for example, that any corrupting effect of market exchange on 
sex can be reduced by interventions that fall short of banning the market. See generally 
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996) (arguing for incomplete 
commodification of certain contested market exchanges). Radin contends that measures such as 
licensing, zoning, and advertising restrictions can keep sex markets in their properly cabined 
place where they are out of sight and thus potentially out of mind. Id. at 132–36. 
 37. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 324. 
 38. Id. 
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school districts with the resources to teach at a level above the floor 
required by standardized tests have failed to do so. Thus, if the 
system has failed on this front it would appear to be because of faulty 
program design, not because of standardized testing itself. 
CONCLUSION 
In Testing As Commodification, Katharine Silbaugh compares 
debates within the standardized testing literature to more traditional 
debates on the commodifying effects of markets. Though the analogy 
between commodification-like arguments across the two settings is 
imperfect, the comparison yields more insights than, I suspect, 
Silbaugh realizes. In particular, though Silbaugh concludes that her 
analysis demonstrates the failures of standardized testing, her analogy 
primarily reveals the politically driven and elitist nature of the 
standardized-testing debate.  
No doubt there are costs, inefficiencies, and failures associated 
with standardized testing, and Silbaugh may well have identified 
elements of the program in need of reform. But, far from 
demonstrating that today’s educational system is systematically 
inferior to the pre-testing status quo, she has primarily shown why the 
objections of many standardized-testing critics should be viewed with 
skepticism, rather than accepted at face value.  
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/17
